

# Varieties of Animalism

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## Abstract

Animalism in its basic form is the view that we are animals. Whether it is a thesis about anything else – like what the conditions of our persistence through time are or whether we're wholly material things – depends on the facts about the persistence conditions and ontology of animals. Thus, I will argue, there are different varieties of animalism, differing with respect to which other theses are taken in conjunction with animalism in its basic form. The different varieties of animalism vary in credibility: some varieties are supported by arguments that are irrelevant to others, and some varieties are susceptible to objections that others can resist. Adequately distinguishing between varieties of animalism is thus an important preliminary to assessing them. In this paper, I'll present and argue for a taxonomy of the most distinctive varieties.

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## 1. Introduction

Animalism in its basic form is the view that we are animals. It's a thesis about the kind of thing that we, human persons, are.<sup>1</sup> Whether it is or entails a thesis about anything else – like what the conditions of our persistence through time are, or whether we are wholly material things – depends on facts about the persistence conditions of animals and whether they are wholly material. Animalism in its basic form, then, does not commit its proponents to a definite stance on issues like how we persist through time or whether we are wholly material, but animalism in its basic form plus other views about the persistence and composition of animals or the nature of our relationship to animals can have corollaries relating to how we persist through time or whether we are wholly material things.

There are many possible pairings of animalism in its basic form and related, other views. I'll call such pairings 'varieties of animalism'. In this paper, I'll present a taxonomy of those varieties. In most contemporary conversations about animalism, the distinctions between varieties have not been very explicitly identified.<sup>2</sup> Thus, neither have the downstream disparities that those distinctions lead to. This has left it unclear what precisely a given variety of animalism is about, what other theses about human persons it is compatible with, and what debates about it turn on.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the different varieties vary in credibility: some varieties will be supported by arguments that are irrelevant to others, and some varieties will be susceptible to objections that other varieties can resist. Adequately distinguishing between varieties of animalism is thus an important preliminary to evaluating them.

Why not focus our evaluation of animalism on animalism in its basic form instead of first developing a taxonomy of its varieties? The reason is that animalism in its basic form says too little to warrant an extended assessment. For example, it says only that we stand in a relation to animals (perhaps that we are identical to them), but it doesn't say what animals are or whether you or I could exist without being one. What sort of evidence would confirm or disconfirm animalism in its basic form if it doesn't tell us what is meant by 'animals' or whether something that is now an animal could ever exist without being an animal?<sup>4</sup> The indeterminacy of animalism in

its basic form may be why philosophers sometimes resort to describing it by contrast with opposing views: animalism is not the view that we are souls, and not the view that we are parts of brains, and not the view that we are material simples, etc.<sup>5</sup> But whether animalism rules out these putative opponents seems to be underdetermined. That we are animals rules out that we are souls, for example, only if animals aren't or can't be souls, but maybe they are or can be.<sup>6</sup> That they are not should not be assumed at the outset. Without fleshing out basic animalism – that is, without pairing it with some other theses and getting a variety of it on the table – there isn't much to say about what it is, what it is not, or whether it's true.

It might also be argued that while basic animalism is too nebulous for further study, the popular One True Animalism isn't, where The One True Animalism is basic animalism plus the theses that animals are wholly material, that whatever is an animal is essentially an animal, and that animals have biological persistence conditions (i.e. that they persist as long as certain biological functions continue).<sup>7</sup> After all, one or more of those theses do seem to be among the assumptions of many animalists and many critics of animalism.<sup>8</sup> They may even be standard assumptions. But they are far from universal. Leading animalist Eric Olson, for example, insists that human persons are *not* essentially animals but rather are animals 'in exactly the same sense that I am a philosopher and a parent'.<sup>9</sup> And there are animalists who argue that animals are not wholly material things: Aristotle, Aquinas, and Toner (2011), (2014), for example.<sup>10</sup> These authors and the fact that they claim that we are animals threaten the idea that One True Animalism is the only genuine variety.

Furthermore, we would do well to avoid a debate over what collection of theses warrants a title. Thus the taxonomy. From now on, let's recognize variety among the views that have shared the title 'animalism'. Let us consider which of those varieties comes out on top evidentially. The taxonomy that I'll propose will help identify which questions which varieties of animalism are suited to answer, what the disputes between animalists and their opponents actually hinge on, and which varieties of animalism are the most plausible.

## 2. The Taxonomy

Alternative answers to the following questions generate the taxonomy.

Essentiality Question: Are human persons *essentially* animals?

Persistence Question: What are the persistence conditions of animals?

Matter Question: What are animals made of?

If the questions were independent, there would be as many items in the taxonomy as there are combinations of answers to the questions, but the questions are not entirely independent. Though the Essentiality Question is independent of the Persistence and Matter Questions, the Persistence and Matter Questions are arguably not independent of each other. For example, if the answer to the Matter Question is *matter and form*, animals could have purely spiritual persistence conditions: perhaps they last across an interval just in case certain activities of their forms continue.<sup>11</sup> But if the answer to the Matter Question is *only matter*, animals' persistence cannot depend on the activity of such forms. Similarly, if animals cannot have prostheses as parts, their persistence conditions cannot allow for surviving the replacement of all their organic parts with artificial ones.<sup>12</sup> Thus, some answers to the Matter Question restrict available answers to the Persistence Question.

Nevertheless, not all answers to the Matter Question make very specific restrictions. For example, although materialism about animals is not compatible with every answer to the

Persistence Question, it is compatible with a range of answers.<sup>13</sup> Materialists about animals could maintain – as they often do – that animals have wholly biological persistence conditions, that they last over time just in case their ‘purely animal functions – metabolism, the capacity to breathe and circulate one’s blood, and the like – continue’.<sup>14</sup> But materialists about animals could alternatively maintain that an animal’s criteria for identity over time are psychological.<sup>15</sup> So while answers to the Matter and Persistence questions are not entirely independent, some answers to one are compatible with diverse answers to the other.

Thus, exactly how many varieties of animalism are in the taxonomy will depend not only on how many answers the above questions have but also on how restrictive the answers are. Moreover, since the answers can be more or less general, some varieties of animalism will be subvarieties of others. For example, a variety of animalism according to which animals are made of organic matter is a sub-version of materialism about animals. One might wonder whether we should count subvarieties as distinct from the varieties that subsume them. If our purpose is to evaluate varieties of animalism better, it seems that we should. Many of the differences between varieties and subvarieties of animalism make for differences in their predictive power and in what arguments can be made for and against them.

Nevertheless, we will not here consider in detail – or even list – every distinct variety or subvariety of animalism that substantive and interesting differences yield. Here, I will focus on the distinctions that make for the most radical theoretical differences. These are the distinctions from which we’ll get the most mileage clarifying what the debates about animalism can and have turned on.

### 3. The Essentiality Question

#### 3.1. INTRODUCTION

Discussion about personal identity centrally tracks at least these two questions: How do we persist? and What kind of thing are we? The answer to *How do we persist?* is our persistence conditions, the criteria we must satisfy in order to persist through an interval of time. Example criteria are having biological continuity or having psychological continuity. The answer to *What kind of thing are we?* is something describing a kind, substantial or accidental, and more or less general. Example answers include *substance*, *material thing*, *mammal*, and *grad student*. Whether a variety of animalism is a thesis about our persistence conditions or is instead a thesis about what kind of thing we are depends on whether, according to the variety in question, human persons are essentially animals.<sup>16</sup>

Let’s consider the two kinds of varieties of animalism that this discussion has introduced. First, let’s consider those that make claims about some of our essential features. These varieties entail something about how we persist. Second, let’s consider those varieties of animalism that do not entail something about how we persist, but rather merely answer *What kind of thing are we?*

#### 3.2. ESSENTIALIST VARIETIES

The claim that human persons are animals could amount to the claim that we are essentially animals. It could entail that wherever and whenever I exist, I am an animal. I can’t exist without being an animal.

There is an ambiguity in the expression ‘Wherever and whenever I exist, I am an animal’ that points to a distinction between essentialist varieties of animalism. ‘Wherever and whenever I exist, I am an animal’ is ambiguous between a view according to which wherever and whenever I exist, I’m some animal or other and a view according to which wherever and whenever I exist,

I'm this one particular animal. Both views are views about our persistence conditions, and both take being an animal to be a necessary condition of our existence. But the second view is narrower than the first, specifying *which* animals it is necessary that each of us be (namely, the ones that each of us now is). This difference is not trivial; the views can make different predictions about whether a human person will (or can) continue to exist if you kill the animal that he is or if you put his animal's brain in another animal's body.

However, these views are distinct only if there is such a thing as relative identity. Without relative identity, the first, broader view (let's call it Broad Essentialist Animalism) collapses into the narrower view (let's call it Narrow Essentialist Animalism). What is special about Broad Essentialist Animalism is that it leaves open the possibility that the same person is identical to different animals. For example, it leaves open the possibility that the animal that I am at  $t_1$  is not identical to the animal that I am at  $t_2$ . But if identity isn't relative, that is not a possibility that can be left open. Here's why. If  $A =$  the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_1$ , and  $A =$  the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_2$ , then by the transitivity of identity, the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_1 =$  the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_2$ . Generally, if identity isn't relative, I can't be different animals at different times; all the animals that I am (so to speak) are in fact the same animal. If identity is relative, however, then it is possible for there to be an  $x$ ,  $y$ ,  $F$  and  $G$  such that  $x$  is the same  $F$  as  $y$  but not the same  $G$  as  $y$ . For example, substitute 'the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_1$ ' for  $x$ , 'the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_2$ ' for  $y$ , 'person' for  $F$ , and 'animal' for  $G$ . If identity is relative, it is possible that the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_1$  is the same person as the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_2$  but not the same animal as the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_2$ . But if every  $x$  that is the same  $F$  as  $y$  is the same  $G$  as  $y$  (as is the case if there is no relative identity), then the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_1$  is the same animal as the animal that is  $A$  at  $t_2$  as long as they are the same person. Thus, the viability of Broad Essentialist Animalism depends on the viability of relative identity. Whether there is a relative identity relation is controversial, and defendants of the view that there is are in the minority.<sup>17</sup> Broad Essentialist Animalism, therefore, is not often defended.

Narrow Essentialist Animalism, on the other hand, is the most common animalist representative in the debate about how we persist.<sup>18</sup> The prominence of Narrow Essentialist Animalism is clear in light of standard evaluations of brain transplant cases, in which it seems to be presumed.

Brain transplant cases are thought experiments in which the brain of a human animal (let's name the person whose brain that is Donor) is transferred, fully functioning and with all of Donor's memories intact, into the empty cranium of another human animal.<sup>19</sup> What's left at the end of the transfer are two living bodies, one which has a brain but which didn't at the beginning of the transplant and one which no longer has a brain but did at the beginning of the transplant. Some people have intuitions about where Donor is after all that. One way to find out what your intuitions are is to ask yourself some questions. For example, suppose that you were married to Donor and you'd like to take your spouse home. Which creature are you going to put in your car? Whichever one you pick is probably the one you intuit to be (or include) the human person.<sup>20</sup> More broadly, you might try to identify which thing you are more interested in taking care of.<sup>21</sup> Once you have a grip on your intuitions about where Donor is, compare those intuitions to the various predictions of different accounts of personal identity. A view according to which human persons are brains will have Donor follow her brain. Does that fit with what you wanted to take home from the hospital? A view according to which whether a person persists depends on the content of her memories will also have Donor follow her brain. A view according to which human persons are essentially the animals that they are, like Narrow Essentialist Animalism, will have Donor follow her animal. This is because according to Narrow Essentialist Animalism, wherever and whenever Donor exists, she is *that* particular animal – in this case, the animal who had a brain this morning and doesn't any more. Plausibly, that animal didn't go anywhere.<sup>22</sup> So it's the brainless but living body on the operating table that is Donor. How does *that* fit with your intuitions?

Animalist interpretations of brain transplant cases (and variants thereof) are generally taken not to fit well with intuitions about brain transplant cases. Thus, brain-transplant sorts of cases are widely recognized as a stumbling block, if not a *coup de grace*, for animalism.<sup>23</sup>

But note well: brain transplant cases like the one involving Donor don't create the same kind of trouble for Broad Essentialist Animalism. According to Broad Essentialist Animalism, in order to continue to exist, a human person just has to be some animal or other, not necessarily the same animal she has been. And so if Broad Essentialist Animalism (but not Narrow Essentialist Animalism) is true, there's no special barrier to identifying Donor, for example, with the body that has a brain at the end of the operation.<sup>24</sup> What this shows is that Broad Essentialist Animalism is not what people assume when they say that our intuitions about brain transplant cases are evidence against animalism. Rather, they seem to be assuming something like Narrow Essentialist Animalism.<sup>25</sup>

Let's take a closer look at Broad Essentialist Animalism, which requires of a person only that she be some animal or other (not necessarily the same animal she is now) in order to continue to exist. Broad Essentialist Animalism is not popularly defended or even explicitly taken seriously in the debate about how we persist. This is due not only to its dependence on an unpopular view of identity, as discussed above, but also to the fact that it doesn't specify what kind of continuity our identity over time consists in. In contrast, Narrow Essentialist Animalism gives you that kind of account. According to Narrow Essentialist Animalism, the kind of continuity that has to hold between a present person and a future person in order for them both to be you is animalian continuity (whatever that amounts to). According to Narrow Essentialist Animalism, the past or future things that are you are the things that are the same animal that you are. Broad Essentialist Animalism doesn't give you that kind of answer to *How do we persist?* Even so, we have good reason to countenance it as a variety of animalism and classify it as a variety that helps answer how we persist. First, it is a view about human persons according to which there are no non-animal human persons. That there are no non-animal human persons is logically equivalent to that all human persons are animals. That equivalence is enough to warrant categorizing this view as an animalist view. Moreover, Broad Essentialist Animalism, because it entails an *essential* connection between human persons and animals, entails an animal-based restriction on the persistence of human persons (even if it doesn't make explicit a complete criterion of a person's identity over time).

For this reason, a variation of the above brain transplant case can be run against Broad Essentialist Animalism (even if the exact brain transplant case given above has no bearing on the view). Suppose Donor walks in for the surgery, and a doctor transfers her brain from her cranium to the cranium-like cavity of a humanoid robot. The robot lights up, having all of Donor's memories, eager to continue saving for that vacation, remembering her wedding day, wanting to go home and see the children, etc. Isn't that Donor? Not according to Broad Essentialist Animalism. At least, not according to Broad Essentialist Animalism if robots aren't animals (not even animaloid ones with animal brains). This is because if Broad Essentialist Animalism is true, nothing that's a non-animal is a human person. Since Donor is a human person, the non-animal robot is not even a Donor-candidate.<sup>26</sup>

We have thus far considered two varieties of animalism that entail something about how we persist. These varieties make essentiality claims. One claims that essentially we are some particular animal (that's Narrow Essentialist Animalism), and the other claims that essentially we are some animal or other (that's Broad Essentialist Animalism). These theories are different enough that they make opposing predictions in certain brain transplant cases. But they have much in common: both entail that there are no non-animal human persons and both make predictions (even if not the same ones) about brain transplant types of cases. The reason both make predictions about brain transplant cases is that both entail something or other about how we persist.

However, brain transplant cases do not pertain to the varieties of animalism that answer only the question, ‘What are we?’ (where our persistence conditions are *not* determined by being whatever is referred to in the answer to that question). In the next section, we will consider varieties of that sort.

### 3.3. NON-ESSENTIALIST VARIETIES

It is sometimes taken for granted that animalism is (or all animalisms are) one of the above varieties. Indeed, essentialist animalisms are popular varieties of animalism. More generally, that animalism is an essentiality claim is implicitly the view of any defender of animalism who takes animalism to be a reply to Locke. This is because Locke’s view about personal identity answers the ‘how do we persist’ question.

But essentialist animalisms are not the only varieties of animalism. Some defend a variety of animalism that is about what kind of thing we are, while denying that (or being neutral about whether) claims about what kind of thing we are entail non-trivial claims about our persistence conditions. This is what Eric Olson is doing when he argues that animalism says that we are animals in the same ordinary sense in which we are parents and music-lovers, and that you could be an animalist in ‘his sense’ without accepting that we are essentially animals.<sup>27</sup>

Some take this to be the view of Thomas Aquinas because they interpret Aquinas to maintain that we are animals who exist between death and the resurrection as non-animals.<sup>28</sup> Let’s skip over details about whether this is his view. But if it is, it’s one according to which human persons are animals but can outlast those animals, and that’s exactly the sort of animalism we are discussing. It’s one that answers ‘What are we?’ without answering ‘How do we persist?’

Though some would not classify non-essentialist views as animalist views, we will count them as varieties of animalism for a couple of reasons: they fit with a straightforward interpretation of the phrase ‘Human persons are animals’, which is characteristic of all varieties of animalism, and other people (for example, Suachelli (2016) and Olson (2015)) seem to take this view to be at least a variety of animalism if not animalism itself.

## 4. The Persistence Question

Recall the brain transplant cases discussed above, the interpretations of which are widely taken to tell against essentialist varieties of animalism. In these cases, Donor’s brain is moved from his head into something else, and we wonder where Donor went. It seems like he went with his brain, but it also seems that essentialist animalism rules that he stayed with his brainless but living body.

But there is a complication: no essentialist variety of animalism, at the level of specificity we have considered so far, *entails* certain interpretations of brain transplant cases. And so brain transplant cases are not in fact definitely evidentially relevant to essentialist varieties of animalism. Whether a given variety of animalism entails that Donor is here or there (or in neither location!) depends not just on whether that variety of animalism is an essentialist variety, but also on what the facts about animal persistence are. Even if there are *plausible* essentialist-animalist deliverances about brain transplant cases, there are no deliverances strictly speaking and independent of negotiable assumptions. And so in order to identify an animalist prediction more precise than ‘The human person will be the human animal, whatever *that* is’, you must answer the Persistence Question.

This indeterminacy is not unique to essentialist *animalisms*. Rather, it is a feature of any essentialist view that is not maximally precise. Consider, for example, the proposition that a human person is essentially a thing that persists through a given length of time if and only if it has the same brain throughout that time. That proposition does not entail anything very particular about which sorts of medical operations, for example, a human person can survive. The reason is that that proposition is indeterminate with respect to which operations a brain can survive as

the same brain. More generally, that proposition does not entail what the persistence conditions of brains are. For example, consider *Brainy*, a human person who persists if and only if she has the same brain. Can she survive a brain transplant? It's not clear because it's not clear whether her brain would survive the transplant. Can a given brain relocate to and govern a new body and yet remain the same brain? Can a brain cease being a proper part of a larger body (as it might have to during a brain transplant) and continue to exist as the same brain? Aristotle did not think that fingers could do that. Cut them off and they aren't really fingers any more. By analogy, the removed brain would not be the same item as the attached brain. And who knows what to say if you reattach the 'fingers' or 'brains' to other bodies? Would they be fingers and brains again? Would they be the same fingers and brains? Is gappy existence possible for brains? That is, could the very same brain go out of existence and then back into it? Even assuming that human persons persist if and only if they have the same brain, we would need to have answers to these questions in order to keep track of the human person in a brain transplant or similar adventure. Similarly, we need to have answers about animal persistence in order to understand whether and how animals would survive brain transplants.

So while it's tempting to say that our intuitions about brain transplant cases are evidence against some varieties of animalism, basic animalism is not determinate with respect to what happens in those cases. It takes two things for a variety of animalism to specify human persons' persistence conditions: the first thing is that the variety has to be an essentialist one, and the second thing is that the variety has to say something about what the persistence conditions of animals are.

One popular account of what the persistence conditions of animals are is what Olson calls the 'Biological Approach'. On this approach, a human animal's persistence through time depends on the continuation of its purely biological processes. Notably, it is the conjunction of the Biological Approach and Narrow Essentialist Animalism that is the usual target of objections from brain transplant cases.<sup>29</sup> This is because in a brain transplant, the donor's biological processes continue in the brainless donor body (provided it survives), and according to the Biological Approach, that means that that animal persists.<sup>30</sup> From Narrow Essentialist Animalism follows the counterintuitive conclusion that the persisting, brainless animal is the person and that the recipient of the brain is not the person.

But an animalist need not adopt the Biological Approach. Andrew Bailey has recently sketched three available alternatives.<sup>31</sup> On one, animal persistence – at least, the persistence of *human* animals – consists in psychological continuity, not biological continuity.<sup>32</sup> On another, hybrid account, an animal persists if either sufficient biological continuity or sufficient psychological continuity is maintained.<sup>33</sup> On a third account, animal persistence depends on what future things we tend to identify ourselves with.<sup>34</sup>

There are even more accounts of persistence conditions available, particularly for proponents of non-materialist animal ontologies. For example, those who think that animals have souls as parts can base animals' criteria for identity over time on the continued existence or activity of the soul.<sup>35</sup> An animalist of this variety has the potential to respond well to brain transplant cases in case the soul performing its activities follows the transplanted brain. If she did, she would be able to say that the animal follows its brain and thus that the person does as well.

### 5. *The Matter Question*

What are animals made of? Are they wholly material things, compounds of matter and something immaterial, or wholly immaterial things? What animals are made of is important because their persistence conditions can depend on what they're made of.<sup>36</sup>

For example, if animals are compounds of matter and something immaterial, there will be a variety of animalism according to which the something immaterial can exist without the matter

and a one according to which the something immaterial cannot exist without the matter. There will be varieties according to which animals are three-dimensional objects and alternatives according to which they are four-dimensional objects.<sup>37</sup> There will be varieties according to which animals can have inorganic or artificial parts and varieties according to which they can't. There will be subvarieties specifying just how many artificial parts they can survive having.<sup>38</sup> There will be varieties according to which material things can continue to exist without being material and varieties according to which they cannot.<sup>39</sup>

The differences between these views matter. For example, if souls are parts of animals, whether it's possible that an animal soul exist without its body (as at least Aristotle seems to deny) will make a difference to some theories about animal life and persistence. For example, that animal souls can exist without animal bodies seems to increase the plausibility of the theory that gappy existence is possible for animals because there is some likelihood that animal souls contain all of the information needed to turn chunks of matter into the animals whose souls they are. Thus, in case an animal goes out of existence, there might be *some* way of getting that animal back: just give that animal's soul some matter to work on. The separability of the animal soul from the animal body is not decisive evidence in favor of the possibility of gappy existence, but it's not wholly irrelevant either.

No matter the ontology of animals in general, questions will remain about the nature of human person candidates in particular. What do we mean by 'animals' when we say that human persons are animals?<sup>40</sup> Will any carbon-based, sentient life form do?<sup>41</sup> If so, there could be a human person who is a dog (provided it's intelligent enough) or one who is a Martian (as long as Martians are sentient and carbon-based). Do we mean something more specific by 'animals'? For example, do we mean anything from the genus *homo sapiens*? A human person who is a Martian would be a counterexample to a variety of animalism where the animals in question are *homo sapiens*. Maybe we mean something less restrictive than *homo sapiens* but more restrictive than 'any carbon-based sentient life form', like we mean anything from the genus *homo*. But we might want to avoid the not-particularly-philosophical categories of biology altogether. Figuring out what we want to say is difficult: it's hard to identify which animals human persons can be in a way that does not define that class of animals by the relationship that the members of that class usually have to human persons.<sup>42</sup>

There are even more questions whose answers partly map out the metaphysical nature of animals. Assuming the animalist proposal is that human persons are *living* animals, we might wonder: What is a life? What is death? Are there dead animals?<sup>43</sup> How do you account for the unity of the disparate parts of a living body?<sup>44</sup> How do you account for the unity of a life? You can probably think of additional ones. What's more: there are multiple coherent ways of answering all of them. For every way, there is another variety of animalism. There will be materialist varieties of animalism: varieties according to which animals are wholly material things. There will be hylomorphic varieties of animalism: varieties according to which animals are body-soul compounds. There will be dualist varieties of animalism: varieties according to which animals are material things animated by some separate, immaterial, non-animal thing. And so on.

## 6. Conclusion

What the above sections show is that there are many ways of being an animalist. One can take animalism to answer 'What kind of thing are we?' and 'How do we persist?' or just one. One can assume a biological approach to persistence conditions, a psychological approach, or another approach. And one can adopt a variety of accounts of the metaphysical nature of human animals.<sup>45</sup>



*Short Biography*

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*Notes*

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<sup>1</sup> Recent defenses of animalism include Bailey (2014), Belshaw (2011), Blatti (2012), (2007), Hershenov (2009), Licon (2012), (2013), Merricks (2001), Olson (1997), (2003), (2007), (2015), Sharpe (2015), Snowdon (1991), (2014 A), (2014 B) Toner (2011), (2014), van Inwagen (1990), Yang (2015).

<sup>2</sup> However, explicit identification of some varieties happens in Olson (2015). Olson identifies three varieties: weak animalism, which is equivalent to what I have called ‘animalism in its basic form’ (98); strong animalism, which is the conjunction of weak animalism and five further claims about the metaphysical nature of animals (98); and new animalism, which is the conjunction of weak animalism and the denial of those five claims (101). Similarly, Bailey (2015) argues that animalism in its basic form is compatible with a variety of views about how animals persist. Snowdon (2014 B: 172) also acknowledges Bailey’s (2015) point.

<sup>3</sup> For example, animalism is often taken to require that ‘psychology is irrelevant to our persistence’ (Hershenov (2008: 481)), to require restricted composition (Olson (2007: 223–232), to be in tension with the thesis that we are identical to brains, and to deliver counterintuitive verdict in brain transplant cases (Olson (2007: 41–42)), Shoemaker (1984)). But some varieties of animalism are innocent of such charges. For example, Sharpe’s (2015) version is innocent of the first, Yang’s (2015) is innocent of the second, Licon’s (2013) is innocent of the third (and fourth), and Olson’s (2015) is innocent of the fourth.

<sup>4</sup> Here’s an important set of data that’s irrelevant if animalism doesn’t specify whether something that is an animal can continue to exist without continuing to exist as an animal: the intuitions about brain transplant cases, which are thought experiments about moving one human’s brain the empty skull of another human body. These intuitions are oft-cited anti-animalism data, but unless animalism specifies whether a human person who is an animal can go on existing not an animal, animalism doesn’t make any predictions about brain transplant cases. Because brain transplant cases are supposed to be key witnesses in understanding personal identity, I discuss them in further detail below. A spoiler: they turn out not to bear on some varieties of animalism.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Blatti (2014), Johansson (2007), Olson (2003), Olson (2007), Noonan (1998).

<sup>6</sup> See Thornton (MS) for a defense of this possibility.

<sup>7</sup> This is the view defended by Olson (1997), (2003), (2007), van Inwagen (1990), Bailey (2014), and many others.

<sup>8</sup> See Hudson (2007) and anyone who thinks that brain transplant types of cases tell against animalism, like Locke (1998) (‘Of Identity and Diversity’, Book II, Chapter XXVII) and Parfit (2012). See also Olson’s (2015: 97–102) account of ‘strong animalism’, of which The One True Animalism is a version, and which Olson identifies as the main target of objections to animalism.

<sup>9</sup> Olson (2015: 92, 96–97). See also Olson (2003).

<sup>10</sup> See also Hershenov (2008), (2011), and Oderberg (2005).

<sup>11</sup> This seems to be the suggestion in Hershenov (2008), for example.

<sup>12</sup> See Pruss (MS) for a defense of the view that no prosthesis (i.e. ‘mechanical device that [...] is neither maintained nor nourished by the body in the way that paradigmatically bodily parts are’) is a part of an animal.

<sup>13</sup> See Bailey (2015) for a careful treatment of this point and a discussion of the criteria for identity over time that are available to the materialist about animals.

<sup>14</sup> Olson (1997: 16)

<sup>15</sup> See Sharpe (2015) for a defense of this view, and see Olson (2015: 102–106) for a critique of it.

<sup>16</sup> And there are two ways for a variety to express an essential relation. One is direct and the other is indirect, by stating our membership to a kind that determines our persistence conditions. If kinds are defined in terms of persistence conditions (as Johansson (2007) seems to assume about substantial kinds), then whether we belong to a given kind will depend on what our persistence conditions are, or what our persistence conditions are will depend on whether we belong to a certain kind (provided an individual can’t change kinds of this sort). Thus, we can see that the answers to these two central questions about personal identity – *How do we persist?* and *What are we?* – possibly go hand-in-hand. Whether they actually go hand in hand depends on what else is true, namely whether one of the kinds that we are in determines our persistence

conditions. Nevertheless what we are *need* not be related to how we persist in this way. At least: a theory about what we are can remain neutral about our persistence conditions and vice versa as long as it doesn't make or depend on assumptions that connect the two. For simplicity's sake, in this paper I will make no assumptions that connect the two.

<sup>17</sup> See Deutsch (2008) for a detailed summary of the debate about relative identity and Geach (1967) for the earliest defense of relative identity.

<sup>18</sup> A narrow essentialist animalism is the animalist representative in Bailey (2014), Mackie (1999), Merricks (2001), Olson (1997), Olson (2007), van Inwagen (1990), Noonan (1998) and many others.

<sup>19</sup> For now, bracket the concerns in Olson (2007) that have him cast brain transplant cases as cerebrum transplant cases.

<sup>20</sup> Of course, you might not in fact think that the one you pick is the human person. You might, for example, think that marriage occurs between animals, not persons, and so it does not matter which of those bodies is the human person you're so familiar with. You're concerned with taking home the right animal (and not so much the right person).

<sup>21</sup> See Hershenov (2011).

<sup>22</sup> Of course, this is the upshot of Narrow Essentialist Animalism only if that brainless animal really is the same animal. It's plausible and commonly assumed that it is, but it wouldn't be incoherent to deny that it is the same animal. You would just have to identify the persistence conditions of animals such that the brainless body (or heap) on the operating table does not meet them. Moreover, if you think that Donor is the animal with a brain at the end of the operation, you'll have to have the conditions be such that that animal *does* meet the persistence conditions you identified. This is why the Persistence Question is extremely important. See Section 4 for more details.

<sup>23</sup> See Locke (1998: 296–314) ('Of Identity and Diversity', Book II, Chapter XXVII); Olson (2007: 42).

<sup>24</sup> There may be concerns about how exactly Donor comes to be the body with a brain at the end of the operation when her old, otherwise-perfectly-good body is still around. But these are something that Broad Essentialist Animalism at least is compatible with getting around. Narrow Essentialist Animalism is not.

<sup>25</sup> Olson (2007: 42) says that cerebrum transplant cases are supposed to show that 'you are not essentially an animal', which he wouldn't think if he had Broad Essentialist Animalism in mind.

<sup>26</sup> The Broad Essentialist Animalist could hold that the animal has shrunk to the size of the brain. In that case, she couldn't say that the *robot* is the animal, but she could say that the robot has a brain-sized animal inside of it. But if no brain is an animal then this route is not available to the Broad Essentialist Animalist either.

<sup>27</sup> See Olson (2015: 92) and Olson (2003). Olson's (2015) 'weak animalism' is a non-essentialist animalism.

<sup>28</sup> For example, Stump (2006), Oderberg (2008), and Brown (2007) maintain that Aquinas thinks that we exist between our deaths and resurrections, but also that we are animals. Others (e.g. Toner (2007), Toner (2009), Toner (2010)) take Aquinas to think that we don't exist between our deaths and resurrections.

<sup>29</sup> More precisely, it is usually the conjunction of Narrow Essentialist Animalism, the Biological Approach, *and* materialism about animals that is the target of objections to animalism from brain transplant cases. But the materialism conjunct is not necessary for the objection to be relevant. For example, a standard brain transplant case can be run as-is against a narrow essentialist animalism where animals are hylomorphic compounds.

<sup>30</sup> This point is actually fairly contentious for *brain* transplant cases since some argue that the life processes plausibly follow the brain and/or brainstem. This is one of the reasons brain transplant cases are often cast as cerebrum transplant cases. Here we will sidestep this particular debate, but it is interesting to note the bearing that a view that is independent of animalism (i.e. the view that biological processes 'follow' the brainstem) has on what an animalist can say about transfer scenarios.

<sup>31</sup> Bailey (2015).

<sup>32</sup> A psychologically serious account like this one is defended by Sharpe (2015).

<sup>33</sup> A disjunctive account like this one is defended by Langford (2014) (who does not take this approach to be compatible with animalism, but it seems that he means by 'animalism' basic animalism plus the Biological Approach.)

<sup>34</sup> This account is inspired by Johnston (2010).

<sup>35</sup> See, for example, Toner (2014).

<sup>36</sup> The importance of outlining the metaphysical nature of animals has not been entirely overlooked. Olson (2007: 27–29) gives a sketch of what he takes the relevant characteristics to be, and Toner (2011) indicates that he takes animals to be hylomorphic compounds, etc.

<sup>37</sup> Olson (2007: 162–168), however, argues that an ontology of temporal parts reduces the problem of personal identity to a linguistic debate. Others, for example Hudson (2007) and Hershenov (2011), don't seem to think so. (Hudson (2007) argues that in some cases, the differences between four-dimensionalist and three-dimensionalist ontologies don't matter to the strength of the animalism.) And Olson (2007: 99–129) seems to think that it might not be a *wholly* linguistic debate after all, suggesting that an ontology of temporal parts can solve an otherwise insoluble problem (pg. 20).

<sup>38</sup> See Pruss (MS) for an example of how the thesis that animals cannot have prosthetics as parts affects the credibility of animalism.

<sup>39</sup> The variety according to which they can continue to exist is not so unbelievable: suppose that thoughts are immaterial. You play chess. You move the king. Arf! Suddenly, the king is eaten by the dog! You keep playing with a mental king that you and the other player have in your minds. It's the same king as the one at the beginning of the game: there is only one king in a chess game, though he might be represented by many lumps or thoughts. Or the king could turn into the shadow of your finger, and shadows aren't material. Either way, the king turned immaterial from being material. (Thanks to Alex Pruss for this example.)

<sup>40</sup> See Olson (2007: Ch 2) for Olson's answer.

<sup>41</sup> Toner (2011) argues that it will do quite well.

<sup>42</sup> The difficulty in avoiding circularity in specifying which animals human persons are supposed to be given animalism is a problem that has preoccupied both critics and defenders of animalism. See Blatti (2014), Johansson (2007), Olson (2007), Noonan (1998) for a sample.

<sup>43</sup> See Hershenov (2005) and Belshaw (2011) for discussions of this question.

<sup>44</sup> See Olson (2007: Chapter 9) for a discussion of this question and what it means for animalism.

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